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I. INTRODUCTION
The Small Business Administration reports that small businesses re-
present ninety-nine percent of all United States employers and em-
ploy approximately one half of the nation's private workforce.1 Sixty-
six percent of those businesses that have employees are corporations. 2
Of those corporations, the vast majority are closely held
corporations. 3
The typical attributes of closely held or close corporations, the
terms are often used interchangeably, are that the shareholders are
few in number, often only two or three; the shareholders usually live
in the same geographical area and are well acquainted with each
other; all or most of the shareholders are active in the business, usu-
ally serving as directors, officers and employees; and there is no estab-
lished market for the corporate stock.4 Most closely held corporations
are formed by family members or friends who pool their resources
and devote their time and energy towards building the business.5
Generally providing employment for themselves is the shareholders'
primary purpose for forming the corporation.6 However, in part be-
cause of the personal relationships that often exist, dissension among
shareholders is common.
The nature of closely held corporations is not conducive to resolv-
ing problems when dissension among shareholders develops. Corpo-
rations operate on the principle of majority rule.7 Therefore, if two
opposing shareholders or two opposing groups of shareholders each
own an equal amount of shares they can become deadlocked prevent-
ing the business from moving forward. When one shareholder or
group of aligned shareholders owns the majority of shares and is,
therefore, able to control the corporation, they are able to use this
1. U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy, Small Business Profiles For The
States And Territories, SMALL BUSINESS ASSOCIATION 1 (JUNE 2014), available at https://www
.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/_AII%2OStates%2013.pdf.
2. U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy, Frequently Asked Questions,
SMALL BUSINESS ASSOCIATION 1 (Mar. 2014), available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/
FAQMarchL2014_0.pdf.
3. See Venky Nagar, Kathy Petroni, & Daniel Wolfenzon, Governance Problems in Close Cor-
porations 1 (NYU Pollack Center for Law & Business Working Paper, 2008) (analyzing the num-
ber of corporation that file tax returns that are listed on major stock indexes and finding that the
vast majority of all U.S. corporations are closely held corporations), available at http://pages
.stern.nyu.edu/-dwolfenz/CC.pdf.
4. 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S CLOSE CORPO-
RATIONS & LLC's: LAW & PRACTICE § 1.02 (Rev. 3d ed. 2013).
5. Id.
6. 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S OPPRESSION
OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 3:6 (Rev. 2d ed. 2013).
7. See id.
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control to operate the corporation for their advantage at the expense
of the minority shareholders. The minority shareholders' problems
are exacerbated by the fact that there is by definition no public mar-
ket and there is rarely a private market for non-controlling interests in
closely held corporations leaving them with no means of exit if they
are being treated unfairly.8
When dissension between majority and minority shareholders de-
velops, it is common for majority shareholders to use their control of
the corporation to freeze the minority shareholders out of the corpo-
ration.9 The goal of the freeze out is to force minority shareholders to
sell their shares for a minimal price or to remain shareholders but not
receive any benefit from the ownership of shares. A common freeze
out technique is termination of minority shareholders' employment.
Termination of employment is a very effective freeze out technique
because it generally results in the terminated minority shareholder
ceasing to receive any benefit from his or her ownership of shares as
profits in closely held corporations are generally distributed through
salaries rather than dividends.10
The potential for abuse of minority shareholders has long been rec-
ognized by courts and state legislatures. Over the past forty years, a
substantial body of law has developed to protect minority sharehold-
ers from oppression by majority shareholders. Thirty-nine states and
the District of Columbia have enacted statutes designed to protect mi-
nority shareholders in closely held corporations.11 Those statutes pro-
vide courts with a variety of remedies to protect shareholders from
oppressive conduct by majority shareholders. However, the legisla-
tures that have enacted those statutes have generally not defined the
term "oppression," leaving it to the courts to do so. 12 Additionally,
courts in several states that do not have shareholder oppression stat-
utes have provided protection to minority shareholders through com-
mon law breach of fiduciary duty actions.13 Those courts have also
had to delineate what type of conduct on the part of majority share-
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S CLOSE COR-
PORATIONS & LLC's: LAW & PRACTICE § 9.18 (Rev. 3d ed. 2014).
12. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW.
699, 708 (1993).
13. See, e.g., Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 (Mass. 2006); Crosby v. Beam, 548
N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989).
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holders is sufficiently oppressive to constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty.14
The most important development in this area in recent years is the
acceptance by courts in a majority of states of the principle that the
goal of shareholder oppression law is the protection of the reasonable
expectations that minority shareholders hold when they participate in
the formation of or join the corporation. 15 This principle requires
courts analyzing claims of shareholder oppression arising out of termi-
nation of employment to determine whether the shareholder has a
reasonable expectation of continued employment and whether the
majority shareholders violated that expectation by terminating the
shareholder's employment. 16
This Article reviews and analyzes the attempts by courts throughout
the United States to articulate the circumstances under which share-
holders of closely held corporations have a reasonable expectation of
continued employment and when the majority's violation of that ex-
pectation through termination of employment entitles the terminated
shareholder to relief. Part II of this Article provides an overview of
judicial approaches to defining shareholder oppression. In Part III,
this Article discusses the background of the reasonable expectations
approach. Part IV provides an analysis of decisions from courts
throughout the country that have applied the reasonable expectations
approach in shareholder oppression cases arising out of termination of
employment. This section also discusses the intersection of the share-
holder oppression and employment at will doctrines and the factors
that courts examine in determining whether a terminated shareholder
had a reasonable expectation of continued employment. Part V, ex-
amines the remedies available to terminated shareholders in share-
holder oppression cases.
II. OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DEFINING
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
Courts have developed two often overlapping approaches in defin-
ing oppression. 17 The first approach, derived from British law, is the
traditional test, sometimes referred to as the "fair dealing" test. The
traditional test defines oppression as:
14. See, e.g., Brodie, 857 N.E.2d at 1079; Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 221.
15. See, e.g., Brodie, 857 N.E.2d at 1079.
16. See id.
17. Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 6 (Wash. 2003); Gimpel v. BoIstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d
1014, 1018-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
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[B]urdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and
fair dealing in the affairs of the company to the prejudice of some of
its members; or a visible departure from the standards of fair deal-
ing, and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder who
entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.
18
The conduct required of majority shareholders under this approach is
closely related to the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing that
controlling shareholders owe to minority shareholders. 19 Thus, courts
analyzing claims of breach of fiduciary duty brought by minority
shareholders often apply the same standard as courts analyzing claims
of oppression under the traditional test.
20
The second approach to defining statutory oppression is the more
recently developed "reasonable expectations" test. That approach de-
fines oppression as "a violation by the majority of the 'reasonable ex-
pectations' of the minority. '21 Oppression is found when the conduct
of the majority shareholders "substantially defeats expectations that,
objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances and
were central to the [minority shareholder's] decision to join the [cor-
poration]. '22 The reasonable expectations approach has also been ap-
plied in common law breach of fiduciary duty actions by courts in
states like Massachusetts that do not have shareholder oppression
statutes. 23
The traditional and reasonable expectations approaches are not mu-
tually exclusive and will often lead to the same result.
"[B]urdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct" by majority sharehold-
ers will usually violate the reasonable expectations of minority share-
holders. 24 However, application of the two approaches will not always
result in the same outcome. Divergent outcomes may result from the
fact that courts applying the traditional approach focus on the conduct
of the majority, whereas courts applying the reasonable expectations
approach focus on the effect of the challenged conduct on the minor-
ity.2 5 In evaluating whether the majority's conduct was proper under
the traditional approach, courts generally analyze whether or not the
18. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 393 (Or. 1973).
19. Id. at 394.
20. Manister v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440 (W. Va. 1980).
21. Gimpel, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1018.
22. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984).
23. See, e.g., Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1079-80 (Mass. 2006).
24. See Gimpel, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1018; Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Cor-
porations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 760 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Moll, Perspective].
25. Moll, Perspective, supra note 24, at 762-63.
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conduct was justified by a legitimate business purpose.26 However,
conduct that may be justified by a legitimate business purpose may
still frustrate the reasonable expectations of a minority shareholder.
For instance, a shareholder may have a reasonable expectation of con-
tinued employment by the corporation. However, the majority share-
holders may have a legitimate business reason for terminating that
shareholder's employment. Whether or not that shareholder is enti-
tled to relief may hinge on whether the court employs the traditional
or reasonable expectations approach.
In recent years, a growing number of courts have adopted the rea-
sonable expectations approach. The Iowa Supreme Court recently
observed that the reasonable expectations test may now be the most
widely followed approach.27 The increasing willingness of courts to
look to the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders in decid-
ing claims of oppression has been described by a leading commentator
as one of the most significant trends in the law of close corporations in
recent years.28
However, while many courts now define oppression as a violation of
a minority shareholder's reasonable expectations, they still face the
task of establishing what shareholder expectations are reasonable.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS APPROACH
The reasonable expectations approach grew out of the recognition
that closely held corporations differ from other types of corporations
in certain fundamental ways.29 First, shareholders of closely held cor-
porations usually "expect to be actively involved in the management
and operation of the [corporation]. ' 30 Second, majority shareholders
may use their ability to control the corporation "to undermine the
expectations of [the] ... minority. ' 31 And third, there is by definition
no public market for shares in closely held corporations and there is
rarely a private market for minority interests. Therefore, minority
shareholders usually have no means of exiting the corporation.32
26. Id.; Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662-63 (Mass. 1976).
27. Baur v. Baur Farms, Inc., 832 N.W.2d 663, 670 (Iowa 2013).
28. 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S CLOSE COR-
PORATIONS & LLCs: LAW & PRACTICE § 9.34 (Rev. 3d ed. 2014).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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In 1980, in Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc., a New York
trial court became one of the first courts to employ the reasonable
expectation standard. 33 Topper involved a claim by a minority share-
holder that the majority shareholders committed oppression by termi-
nating his employment entitling him to relief under the New York
Business Corporation Law.34 Topper, a pharmacist, left his job of
twenty-five years and moved from Florida to New York to form, with
two other shareholders, a corporation that operated pharmacies
within hotels.35 He invested his life savings in the venture and person-
ally guaranteed all of the corporation's debts. 36 Approximately one
year later, the two other shareholders, who together held a majority of
the shares, terminated Topper's employment.37 The court applied the
reasonable expectations test noting both the special characteristics of
closely held corporations as well as the similarity between closely held
corporations and partnerships.3 8 Applying that standard, the court
held that the majority shareholders' termination of Topper violated
his reasonable expectation of continued employment and constituted
oppression within the meaning of the statute.39 The court refused to
consider the majority shareholders' asserted legitimate purpose in ter-
minating Topper holding that their reason for terminating him was
irrelevant.40
Four years later, in the landmark case of In re Kemp & Beatley, the
New York Court of Appeals, citing Topper, endorsed the reasonable
expectations standard for defining oppression.41 In determining that
the reasonable expectations approach is the appropriate standard for
defining oppression, the court looked to the special nature of closely
held corporations including the typical expectations of shareholders
that they will be involved in the management of the corporation and
will receive the benefits of ownership through employment. 42
The reasonable expectations approach has now been adopted by
courts throughout the country. However, even among courts that
have accepted the reasonable expectations approach, there is not uni-
versal agreement as to which types of shareholders are entitled to pro-
33. 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 361-62.
36. Id. at 362.
37. Id.
38. Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 364-65.
39. Id. at 362.
40. Id.
41. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984).
42. Id.
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tection under the reasonable expectations standard. Some courts hold
that the reasonable expectations analysis is only appropriate for
claims brought by shareholders who are founders of the corporation.43
The rationale for that position is that the relationship between the
founding shareholders of a corporation is similar to that of partners.44
Like partners, the founding shareholders enter "into spoken and un-
spoken" agreements that are personal in nature.45 The reasonable ex-
pectations approach seeks to enforce those agreements. 46 However,
shareholders who were not among the original shareholders of the
corporation were not parties to the agreement and do not have the
right to enforce it.47 In articulating that position, the court in Gimpel
v. Bolstein stated that the agreement between the founding sharehold-
ers "will not run with the shares. '48
Applying that rationale, some courts hold that the reasonable ex-
pectations approach is not appropriate to claims brought by share-
holders who receive their shares through gift or inheritance. 49 Other
courts hold that, while the reasonable expectations approach may be
applied to claims brought by shareholders who received their shares
by gift or inheritance, those types of shareholders are entitled to lower
expectations than founder shareholders.5 0
Similarly, some courts decline to apply the reasonable expectations
approach to claims brought by non-founder shareholders who receive
their shares as part of an employment compensation package or are
allowed to purchase shares as a benefit of employment.5 1 Likewise,
other courts hold that shareholders who receive their shares through
an employment compensation package have lower expectations than
founder shareholders.52
Restricting or limiting the reasonable expectations approach to
founder shareholders is by no means universal. For instance, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that shareholders who re-
ceive their shares through gift or inheritance are entitled to have their
reasonable expectations protected, in part, because they did not have
43. See, e.g., Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 6 (Wash. 2003); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
44. Gimpel, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1019.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quotations omitted).
49. Gimpel, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1019.
50. See, e.g., Mueller v. Cedar Shore Resort, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 56, 64 (S.D. 2002).
51. See, e.g., Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 6 (Wash. 2003); Merola v. Exergen Corp.,
668 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Mass. 1996).
52. See, e.g., Berreman v. W. Publ'g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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the opportunity to negotiate for any sort of protection of their expec-
tations.53 Many courts apply the reasonable expectations test to
claims brought by non-founder shareholders, including shareholders
who receive their shares through inheritance or as a benefit of em-
ployment, without specifically addressing the issue of whether the ap-
proach is available to claims brought by these types of shareholders. 54
IV. APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS APPROACH
IN CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF TERMINATION
OF EMPLOYMENT
Shareholders of closely held corporations have both general and
specific expectations.55 General expectations are shared by all share-
holders and arise simply from the ownership of shares.5 6 Examples of
general expectations are the right to a proportionate share of the prof-
its of the corporation, the right to any appreciation of the shares, the
right to vote the shares if the shares have voting rights, and the right
to inspect the books and records for a proper purpose.57 All share-
holders are presumed to have general expectations. 58
Specific expectations, on the other hand, require 1) evidence of
facts giving rise to the expectations among the shareholders of the
corporation, 2) a showing that the expectations were reasonable under
the circumstances, and 3) proof that the expectations were central to
the minority shareholder's decision to become a shareholder. 59 Ex-
amples of specific expectations that may be reasonable in particular
circumstances are employment by the corporation and a role in
management. 60
Not surprisingly, the majority of shareholder disputes that end up in
litigation involve alleged violations of specific expectations. Violation
of a shareholder's expectation of continued employment through ter-
mination is a commonly litigated claim.
Oppression of minority shareholders often involves an escalating
course of conduct. Termination of employment is often the straw that
breaks the camel's back and causes the minority shareholder to seek
53. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558-59 (N.C. 1983).
54. See, e.g., Baur v. Baur Farms, Inc., 832 N.W.2d 663, 670-71 (Iowa 2013); Hendrick v. Hen-
drick, 755 A.2d 784, 791 (RI. 2000).
55. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: Of Change, Gifts,
and Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717, 767 (2002).
56. Id. at 765-66.
57. Id. at 766 & 766 n.157.
58. Id. at 765.
59. Id. at 767.
60. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at § 3:6.
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counsel and file a shareholder oppression claim. This is because, for
most shareholders of closely held corporations, providing employment
for themselves is their primary motivation for participating in the for-
mation of or joining the corporation and the salary derived from that
employment is typically the minority shareholders' primary source of
income.61 Therefore, termination of a minority shareholder's employ-
ment is a common and effective freeze out technique. 62 Termination
of a minority shareholder's employment often results in the minority
shareholder ceasing to receive any financial benefit from the corpora-
tion as earnings in closely held corporations are generally distributed
through salaries and bonuses rather than through dividends. 63
Therefore, it is not surprising that many claims of minority share-
holder oppression arise out of the termination of a shareholder's em-
ployment. Terminated shareholders argue that they have a reasonable
expectation of continued employment by the corporation that was vio-
lated by the majority's action in terminating them. However, as an
expectation of employment is not a general expectation held by all
shareholders of corporations, terminated shareholders must establish
that their expectation of continued employment was reasonable in the
context of the corporation at issue. In deciding whether a share-
holder's expectation of employment was reasonable, courts often first
evaluate whether the employment at-will doctrine is applicable to the
shareholder's claim.
A. The Employment At-Will Doctrine in Shareholder
Oppression Cases
The employment at-will doctrine provides that the employment re-
lationship, absent a contract to the contrary, is "'at-will' meaning that
either the employer or the employee can terminate the relationship at
any time for any reason, even for no reason, without legal liability
attaching. ' 64 Although several statutory and common law exceptions
to the employment at-will doctrine have developed, it "remains the
presumptive employment relationship." 65
61. Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473
N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984).
62. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at § 3:6.
63. Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and
Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 431 (1990).
64. Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of A Doctrine, 37 Am.
Bus. L.J. 653, 653 (2000).
65. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression v. Employment At Will in the Close Corpora-
tion: The Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 517, 534 (1999) [hereinafter Moll,
Investment Model].
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Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc. demonstrates how application of
the employment at-will doctrine to a claim brought by a terminated
minority shareholder can leave the shareholder without a remedy. 66
Ingle began working for a Ford dealership and subsequently pur-
chased shares, at one point owning forty percent of the outstanding
shares.67 He was actively involved in the management of the company
serving as a director and first vice-president, personally guaranteed
the corporate debt and advanced his own funds to the company when
it was in need of working capital. 68 He never had an employment
agreement. 69 After seventeen years, the majority shareholder termi-
nated Ingle's employment, removed him as an officer and director and
replaced him with the majority shareholder's sons.70 The majority
shareholder then forced Ingle to sell his shares pursuant to a
mandatory repurchase provision in the shareholder agreement. 71 The
New York Court of Appeals held that, as Ingle did not have an em-
ployment contract, his termination was proper under the employment
at-will doctrine and his status as a shareholder did not exempt him
from the effect of that rule. 72
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Hancock, with Judge Kaye con-
curring, argued that the case should have been analyzed under the
shareholder oppression doctrine rather than the employment at-will
doctrine and that the central issue should have been whether Ingle's
reasonable expectation of continued employment had been violated.73
Like the dissenting judges in Ingle, some courts have held that the
employment at-will doctrine is not applicable to shareholder-employ-
ees.74 Other courts accept the continued validity of the employment
at-will doctrine generally for shareholder-employees, but hold that the
doctrine is not applicable when employment is intertwined with the
the shareholder's investment in the corporation.75 Numerous courts
have simply ignored the employment at-will doctrine in reviewing
claims brought by terminated shareholder-employees. 76 Thus, many
66. Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1317-18 (N.Y. 1989).
67. Id. at 1315.
68. Id. at 1315.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1312.
71. Ingle, 535 N.E.2d at 1312.
72. Id. at 1313, 1321.
73. Id. at 1317-18 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ohio App. Ct. 1992).
75. See, e.g., Kortum v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 432, 440-41 (N.D. 2008); Gunderson v. Alliance
of Computer Prof'ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d
460, 471 (5th Cir. 2000).
76. See Moll, Investment Model, supra note 65, at 520.
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courts now recognize an exception to the employment at-will doctrine
for minority shareholder-employees of closely held corporations at
least where employment is intertwined with the shareholder's invest-
ment in the corporation.
However, even if a court does not apply the employment at-will
doctrine, the shareholder must still establish that his or her expecta-
tion of continued employment was reasonable under the circum-
stances. There are certain factors that courts look to in evaluating the
reasonableness of an expectation of continued employment.
B. Factors Analyzed by Courts in Evaluating the Reasonableness of
an Expectation of Continued Employment
1. The Interconnectedness of Employment and the
Shareholder's Investment
In evaluating reasonableness of a shareholder's expectation of con-
tinued employment, courts often look to the interconnectedness of the
shareholder's employment and his or her investment.77 Employment
is considered part of the shareholder's investment where the share-
holder anticipates receiving a return on his or her investment prima-
rily through salary and employee benefits rather than through
dividends and where securing employment was the reason that the
shareholder originally invested in the corporation. 78 The factors that
courts consider include: whether the shareholder made a capital in-
vestment in the company; whether the shareholder's salary could be
considered a de facto dividend; and whether continued employment
was a significant reason that the shareholder made the investment. 79
For instance, in McLaughlin v. Schneck, the Utah Supreme Court
held that McLaughlin, an executive who joined the company approxi-
mately ten years after it was formed and whose employment "allowed
him to purchase stock.., but [did not require him] to do so," did not
have a reasonable expectation of continued employment.80 The court
found McLaughlin's ownership of stock was separate from his em-
ployment. 81 McLaughlin received a salary that was based solely on
the value of his work and his investment was "separately rewarded
77. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 158 (Utah 2009); Kortum, 755 N.W.2d at
446; Gunderson, 628 N.W.2d at 191; Moll, Investment Model, supra note 65, at 521.
78. Moll, Investment Model, supra note 65, at 523.
79. See e.g., McLaughlin, 220 P.3d at 158; Kortum, 755 N.W.2d at 446; Haley v. Forcelle, 669
N.W.2d 48, 59-60 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Gunderson, 628 N.W.2d at 191; Hollis, 232 F.3d at 471;
Moll, Investment Model, supra note 65, at 523 & 523 n.28.
80. 220 P.3d 146, 158 (Utah 2009).
81. Id.
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through the payment of dividends. '8 2 Significantly, he continued to
receive dividends after his employment was terminated.83
In contrast, in Balvik v. Sylvester, the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that Balvik, a minority shareholder who was a founder of the
corporation having invested capital to start the corporation, had a rea-
sonable expectation of continued employment where his salary consti-
tuted the only benefit that he received from the corporation as no
dividends were paid and none were likely to be paid in the future.8 4
Investment does not necessarily require the tender of capital to the
corporation. Some courts have viewed a shareholder's service to the
corporation as an investment entitling the shareholder to a reasonable
expectation of continued employment.85
2. The Existence of Employment and Shareholder Agreements
Another factor courts look to in assessing the reasonableness of a
shareholder's expectation of continued employment is the existence of
any agreement. The two types of agreements that often exist that are
relevant to this inquiry are employment agreements and buy-sell
agreements that provide for the repurchase of shares upon the occur-
rence of certain events.86 Some courts have held that shareholders
who entered into employment or buy-sell agreements that contem-
plate involuntary termination do not have a reasonable expectation of
continued employment.
For instance, in Blank v. Chelmsford OB/GYN, P.C., the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of a minority
shareholder's breach of fiduciary duty claim based on termination of
employment where the shareholder-employee executed employment
and buy-sell agreements providing, respectively, that he could be ter-
minated without cause upon six months' notice and that his shares
were to be repurchased upon termination of his employment for any
reason whatsoever.87
Similarly, in Ingle, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of Ingle's shareholder oppression claim arising out of the
termination of his employment where he had entered into a buy-sell
agreement providing that his shares must be repurchased if he ceased
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 384, 388 (N.D. 1987).
85. See, e.g., Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Products Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985).
86. "Buy-sell" agreements are often contained within shareholder agreements that address
various aspects of the shareholders' relationship.
87. 649 N.E.2d 1102, 1105-06 (Mass. 1995).
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to be an employee for any reason.8 8 Because of that agreement, the
majority refused to consider Ingle's argument that his status as a mi-
nority shareholder protected him from arbitrary termination.89 In a
dissenting opinion, Judge Hancock, Jr. and Judge Kaye disagreed with
the majority that, by entering into an agreement in which his shares
would be repurchased if he ceased to be an employee, Ingle agreed
that he could be terminated for any reason. 90 For the dissenting
judges, there were triable issues of fact as to Ingle's understanding of
the language of the agreement and whether he had a reasonable ex-
pectation of continued employment.91
The North Dakota and Minnesota corporation acts explicitly pro-
vide that written agreements are presumed to reflect the parties' ex-
pectations concerning matters dealt with in the agreements. 92
However, shareholders in those states are afforded an opportunity to
rebut the statutory presumption and courts in those states treat the
issue of whether a shareholder who executed a shareholder agreement
providing for repurchase of shares upon involuntary termination has a
reasonable expectation of continued employment as an issue of fact.93
For instance, in Kortum v. Johnson, the trial court had dismissed as
a matter of law an oppression claim brought by a terminated minority
shareholder because she executed a buy-sell agreement providing for
the mandatory repurchase of her shares if she was involuntarily termi-
nated for any reason.94 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
and remanded for a determination as to whether the agreement re-
flected the parties' reasonable expectations at the venture's incep-
tion.95 On remand, the trial court made a factual finding that the buy-
sell agreement reflected the parties' expectations and that, therefore,
the shareholder did not have a reasonable expectation of continued
employment. 96 That decision was affirmed by the North Dakota Su-
preme Court.97
A finding that a shareholder who signs an employment agreement
providing for termination without cause does not have a reasonable
88. Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (N.Y. 1989).
89. Id. at 1313.
90. Id. at 1317 (Hancock, Jr., J. dissenting).
91. Id.
92. N.D. CENT. CODE ArN. § 10-19.1-115(5) (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751,
subd. 3a (West 2014).
93. Kortum v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 432, 446-47 (N.D. 2008); Gunderson v. Alliance of Com-
puter Prof'ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
94. 755 N.W.2d 432, 435-36 (N.D. 2008).
95. Id. at 449.
96. Id. at 446-47.
97. Kortum v. Johnson, 786 N.W.2d 702, 706 (N.D. 2010).
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expectation of continued employment makes sense. The purpose of
employment agreements is to memorialize the parties' understandings
concerning the terms of employment, and provisions in employment
agreements providing that termination may be without cause are gen-
erally straightforward. However, extrapolating that a shareholder
does not have a reasonable expectation of continued employment
from language in a buy-sell agreement providing for repurchase of
shares upon involuntary termination is not as logical. Buy-sell agree-
ments generally provide for either the "mandatory or optional repur-
chase of a shareholder's shares . . . upon the [happening] of certain
event[s]" such as death, disability, bankruptcy and termination of em-
ployment.98 The principal purpose of buy-sell agreements is "to per-
mit the original owners of the corporation to retain control over the
identity of their business associates." 99 A secondary purpose is "to
protect the investment of the departing (or the estate of the departed)
shareholder by facilitating the valuation and sale of an interest that
might otherwise have no ready market." 100 Buy-sell agreements are
not generally intended to memorialize the parties' understandings
concerning the terms of employment. An agreement in which a share-
holder agrees that his or her shares will be repurchased if an involun-
tary termination occurs is not the same as an employment agreement
in which an employee agrees that he or she may be involuntarily ter-
minated without cause.
Recognizing the difficulty in extrapolating a shareholder's expecta-
tions concerning employment from a repurchase provision in a buy-
sell agreement, in Grady v. Grady, a Rhode Island court held that
language in a buy-sell agreement providing for mandatory repurchase
of a shareholder's shares upon involuntary termination of employ-
ment was too vague to establish that the shareholder did not have a
reasonable expectation of continued employment. 10 1 The court ob-
served that involuntary termination could occur due to other reasons
such as serious illness. 102
In Ingle, the dissenting judges disagreed with the majority's finding
that Ingle did not have a reasonable expectation of continued employ-
ment as matter of law based on the repurchase provision of the share-
holder agreement in part because he had not been represented by an
98. Stephenson v. Drever, 947 P.2d 1301, 1304 (Cal. 1997).
99. Id. at 1304.
100. Id.
101. No. PB 09-0367, 2012 WL 171006, at *27-28 (R.I. Super. Jan. 17, 2012).
102. Id. at *27.
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attorney when he signed the agreement.10 3 It is very common for mi-
nority shareholders to participate in forming or to join a corporation
without the benefit of counsel to ensure that their interests are pro-
tected.10 4 One reason for that is that close corporations are often
"formed by friends or family members who simply may not believe
that disagreements could ever arise. ' 10 5 If an attorney is used, that
attorney is often selected by the majority shareholder. Despite the
attorney's fiduciary duty to all of the shareholders, the attorney may
not zealously protect the minority shareholders' interests when draft-
ing the buy-sell agreement and other corporate documents. In situa-
tions where employees are given the opportunity to buy stock of an
existing corporation, they often value the opportunity to become a
shareholder but are in a weak bargaining positon and are unlikely to
insist upon protection.10 6 Therefore, extrapolating a shareholder's ex-
pectations concerning the terms of employment from general lan-
guage in buy-sell agreements is problematic.
3. Shareholder Guarantees of Corporate Debt
One factor that has received little attention by courts in assessing
the reasonableness of a shareholder's expectation of continued em-
ployment is whether the shareholder personally guaranteed corporate
debt. Lenders commonly require shareholders of closely held corpo-
rations to personally guaranty loans to the corporation. A share-
holder who is terminated, but has executed a personal guarantee,
remains personally obligated to the creditor. Therefore, it is unlikely
that a shareholder would agree to guaranty corporate debt unless the
shareholder expected to be involved in the company's operations as a
managerial employee in order to ensure that the company is able to
and does repay the loans. Such an expectation would be objectively
reasonable. However, a shareholder's willingness to guaranty corpo-
rate debt has not received much discussion in cases evaluating the rea-
sonableness of a shareholder's expectation of continued employment.
In Ingle, the dissenting judges argued that there were triable issues
of fact as to whether Ingle had a reasonable expectation of continued
employment in part because he had personally guaranteed corporate
103. 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1317 (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, Jr., dissenting).
104. See Murdock, supra note 63, at 426.
105. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558 (1983) (quoting Julia Rider, Comment,
Dissolution Under the California Corporations Code: A Remedy for Minority Shareholders, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 595, 603-04 (1975)).
106. Id. (quoting J.A.C. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the
Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 18 (1969)).
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debt. 0 7 Though, as discussed above, the majority of New York Court
of Appeals judges declined to consider that position.108
However, in Haley v. Forcelle, the Minnesota Appellate Court held
that a terminated shareholder who personally guaranteed $4.3 million
of corporate debt did have a reasonable expectation of continued em-
ployment.10 9 The court observed that it is "unlikely that [the share-
holder] would have agreed to personally guaranty company debt if he
did not expect to have a continued role in the operations and manage-
ment of the company" so that he could ensure that the company paid
the debt for which he had agreed to be personally liable."10
Given the prevalence of personal guarantees, it is surprising that
this issue has not received more attention by courts evaluating the
reasonableness of a shareholder's expectation of continued
employment.
4. Shareholder Misconduct and Incompetence
Not surprisingly, courts routinely hold that, where a shareholder-
employee engages in misconduct, any expectation of continued em-
ployment that the shareholder may have is not reasonable. For in-
stance, in Whitehorn v. Whitehorn Farms, Inc., the Montana Supreme
Court held that a shareholder who converted corporate property did
not have a reasonable expectation of continued employment and was
properly terminated."'
In Gimpel v. Bolstein," 2 an action brought by Robert Gimpel, a
minority shareholder who had been terminated for stealing money
from the corporation, the court observed that:
it must be recognized that "reasonable expectations" do not run
only one way. To the extent that Robert may have entertained
"reasonable expectations" of profit in 1975, the other shareholders
also entertained "reasonable expectations" of fidelity and honesty
from him. All such expectations were shattered when Robert stole
from the corporation. His own acts broke all bargains. Since then,
the only expectations he could reasonably entertain were those of a
discovered thief: ostracism and prosecution. To the extent that the
majority has refrained from prosecuting him, they have dealt with
him more kindly than he had reason to expect, not less.13
107. 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1314-15 (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J. dissenting).
108. Id. at 1315.
109. 669 N.W.2d 48, 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
110. Id.
111. 195 P.3d 836, 843 (Mont. 2008).
112. 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
113. Id. at 1019-20 (citations omitted).
318 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:301
Thus, the court held that Robert's termination was not oppres-
sive. 114 However, despite his misdeeds, the court held that there were
limits on how shabbily Robert could be treated and that it was "con-
strained to recognize that Robert cannot be forever compelled to re-
main an outcast."'1 15 Citing Genesis, the court observed that "even
Cain was granted protection from the perpetual vengefulness of his
fellow man. 11 6 The court, therefore, ordered that the majority share-
holders either purchase Robert's shares for a legitimate price or com-
mence a policy of paying all of the shareholders, including Robert,
meaningful dividends." 7 Key to the court's decision to order those
alternative remedies was its finding that the corporation had histori-
cally distributed all of its profit through salaries rather than paying
dividends."" Therefore, by barring Robert from employment, the
majority assured that he would not receive his share of the corpora-
tion's profits. Thus, while Robert had forfeited his specific expecta-
tion of continued employment by stealing from the company, he was
still entitled to the general expectation of a share of the profits. 19
Shareholders who do not competently perform their duties as em-
ployees also do not have a reasonable expectation of continued em-
ployment.' 20 For instance, in Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.,
the court held that the plaintiff, who had been gifted shares of a cor-
poration that operated a restaurant from his father-in-law, forfeited
any expectation of continued employment. 121 This was because he
"failed to get along with other employees, causing the loss of key per-
sonnel,... quit on more than one occasion," and failed to "learn the
business.' 22 Similarly, in Bogosian v. Woloohojian, the court held
that a shareholder who stopped performing any work as an employee
after she had been removed as president did not have a legitimate
expectation of continued employment. 23
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1021.
116. Id.
117. Gimpel, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1022.
118. See id. at 1020.
119. See id. at 1021.
120. See Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof'ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 192 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001).
121. 400 A.2d 554, 556, 562 (N.J. Super. 1979), affd 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. App. Ct. 1980).
122. Id. at 561-62.
123. See 167 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498 (D.R.I. 2001).
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C. Consideration of the Majority's Purpose for Termination in
Evaluating the Reasonableness of a Shareholder's
Expectation of Continued Employment
Courts applying the reasonable expectations analysis focus on the
minority's expectations rather than on the majority's motivation for
the termination. Therefore, a court applying a pure reasonable expec-
tations approach does not take the majority's reasons for terminating
the minority shareholder into account. For example, in both Balvik v.
Sylvester 124 and In re Topper125 discussed above, the courts refused to
consider the majority's purported justification for the terminations,
holding that the majority's purpose for termination was irrelevant.
In contrast to the minority centered focus of the reasonable expec-
tations approach, courts that apply the traditional test of oppression
focus on the conduct of the majority.126 As a result, these courts are
more concerned with preserving the majority's discretion to make de-
cisions.127 Courts applying the traditional test will not find oppression
liability where the majority can demonstrate a legitimate business pur-
pose for its actions even if those actions harm minority
shareholders.128
However, some courts that have applied the reasonable expecta-
tions approach have been willing to take the majority's purpose for
termination into account. Those courts attempt to strike a balance
between the minority shareholder's expectations and the corpora-
tion's need to run the business efficiently.
29
An early example of this balancing approach is the landmark case
of Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.130 In Wilkes, a decision of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, dissension among share-
holders led to the termination of a dissenting shareholder's employ-
ment.' 3 ' Wilkes and three others had formed Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., a corporation which owned real estate and operated a
nursing home on the property. 132 All four were directors, participated
in the management of the business, and were employees performing
124. 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987).
125. 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
126. See Moll, Perspective, supra note 24, at 762-63 & 768-69.
127. Id. at 767.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof'ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 191 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001); Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1033 (N.J. 1993).
130. 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
131. Id. at 661.
132. Id. at 659.
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different duties for the corporation. 133 Quinn, one of the sharehold-
ers, sought to have another corporation in which he had an ownership
interest purchase a portion of Springside's property. 134 Wilkes pre-
vailed on the other shareholders "to procure a higher sales price than
Quinn [wished] to pay" which led to "bad blood" between Wilkes and
Quinn. 135 The two other shareholders sided with Quinn and the three
used their majority control to not re-elect Wilkes as a director or of-
ficer and to terminate his employment, although he had not commit-
ted any misconduct and had performed his duties competently. 136
In an early statement of the importance of continued employment
for minority shareholders to receive a return on their investment, the
Wilkes court observed that "[b]y terminating a minority stockholder's
employment.., the majority effectively frustrate the minority stock-
holder's purposes in entering the corporate venture and also deny him
an equal return on his investment.' 1 37 The Wilkes court's focus on the
minority shareholder's purpose for joining the corporation was a pre-
cursor of the reasonable expectations approach.
However, the Wilkes court did not focus solely on the expectations
of the minority shareholder. The court expressed concern that focus-
ing solely on the minority shareholder could impose "limitations on
legitimate action by the controlling group" that would "unduly ham-
per its effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best interest of
all of [the shareholders]. ' 138 The court established a procedure for
reviewing claims brought by minority shareholders to balance the pro-
tection needed by minority shareholders with the flexibility needed by
the controlling shareholders in order to effectively manage the busi-
ness. 139 First, the majority shareholders must "demonstrate a legiti-
mate business purpose for its action[s].' 140  If the majority
shareholders are able to establish that they had a legitimate business
purpose, the burden shifts to the minority shareholder to demonstrate
that that purpose could have been achieved through alternate means
that would have been less harmful to the minority's interest.' 41 The
court found that the majority shareholders did not demonstrate a le-
gitimate business purpose, inferring that their real intention was to
133. Id. at 659-60.
134. Id. at 660.
135. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660.
136. Id. at 661, 664.
137. Id. at 662-63.
138. Id. at 663.
139. See id.
140. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
141. Id.
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freeze Wilkes out and to force him to sell his shares for a price below
their value. 142
The Wilkes approach of balancing minority shareholders' expecta-
tions and majority shareholders' need to operate the business effi-
ciently has been followed by courts in other jurisdictions. In an
attempt to achieve this balance, courts, even those that utilize the rea-
sonable expectations approach, may deny relief where the majority
shareholders can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for the
termination if the terminated shareholder cannot establish that there
was a less harmful alternative to termination.
For instance, in Grady v. Grady, a Rhode Island Superior Court
analyzed a matter involving a corporation owned by three brothers in
which two brothers used their combined majority to terminate a third
brother, William, who had been the president of the corporation.
143
The court found that "William did have a reasonable expectation of
continued employment."'144 However, the court did not end the analy-
sis at that point. The other brothers were given an opportunity to
demonstrate that they had a legitimate business purpose for termina-
tion.145 The brothers were able to meet this burden by demonstrating
that "William was chronically absent from work" and disruptive to the
company's operations by "pulling employees away from their assigned
[tasks] and [assigning] them to . . . unnecessary tasks [in order to
show] his authority. ' 146 However, utilizing the Wilkes procedure, the
court held that William was entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate
that there was a less harmful alternative to termination and ordered
further proceedings so that it could make a factual determination as to
that issue. 147
In assessing the legitimacy of the majority's asserted business pur-
pose, courts will attempt to separate actual reasons for termination
from pretext. In O'Connor v. U.S. Art Co., a Massachusetts Superior
Court held that the controlling shareholders did not act with a legiti-
mate business purpose when they terminated O'Connor, a minority
shareholder who served as president, allegedly due to O'Connor's
poor bookkeeping, where the termination occurred after negotiations
for the purchase of O'Connor's shares had stalled and the majority
shareholders had long been aware of his shoddy bookkeeping prac-
142. See id. at 663-64.
143. No. 09-0367, 2012 WL 171006, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2012).
144. Id. at *13.
145. Id. at *9.
146. Id. at *10.
147. Id. at *11.
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tices. 148 The court held that the asserted purpose was really a pretext
for the majority's decision to freeze O'Connor out of the business. 49
Similarly, in Pointer v. Castellani, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court rejected the majority shareholders' claim that they acted
with a legitimate business purpose in terminating a minority share-
holder who served as president because he was the owner of a sepa-
rate company that purchased real estate from the corporation.150 The
court held that the asserted purpose was contrived as the majority
shareholders had always been aware of the separate corporation.151
Where shareholders have not performed their duties adequately,
courts have held that there was a legitimate business purpose for ter-
mination. For instance, in Priebe v. O'Malley, the Ohio Appellate
Court found that majority shareholders had a legitimate business pur-
pose for termination where the terminated shareholder was "not pro-
ducing sales and ... was not working well with other employees" and
there was evidence that the terminated shareholder converted corpo-
rate property for his personal use. 152
However, that the business may have suffered setbacks generally
may not constitute a legitimate reason for terminating a minority
shareholder-employee where the decline is not attributable to the
shareholder. In Gigax v. Repka, the Ohio Appellate Court held that
there was not a legitimate business purpose for terminating a share-
holder-employee where the corporation experienced a decline but the
majority failed to establish that the decline was caused by the termi-
nated shareholder. 53
Under the Wilkes formula, once the majority shareholders establish
that they had a legitimate business purpose for termination, the bur-
den shifts to the minority shareholder to establish that the purpose
could have been accomplished through means less harmful than termi-
nation.1 54 It is this opportunity to establish that the majority's pur-
pose could have been achieved through means other than termination
that distinguishes courts that attempt to balance the interests of the
majority and the minority from courts that simply apply the tradi-
tional test. The latter end the analysis if the majority is able to estab-
lish a legitimate business purpose for termination.
148. No. 031728BLS, 2005 WL 1812512, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 2005) affd 850
N.E.2d 1135 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
149. See id. at *9-10.
150. 918 N.E.2d 805, 818 (Mass. 2009).
151. Id.
152. 623 N.E.2d 573, 575-76 (Ohio 1993).
153. 615 N.E.2d 644, 650 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
154. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
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However, there are very few reported cases in which courts have
addressed whether there were less harmful alternatives. Perhaps this
is due to the reluctance of courts to involve themselves too intimately
in the operations of the business. The decisions in which courts used
the Wilkes balancing procedure are predominantly from Massachu-
setts, which is not surprising as Wilkes was a decision of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court. However, the Wilkes approach of
balancing the minority shareholder's expectations with the majority's
need to operate the business efficiently has been adopted by courts in
other jurisdictions. Therefore, minority shareholders in those jurisdic-
tions who are terminated for legitimate business purposes do have the
opportunity of demonstrating that those purposes could have been
achieved through means less harmful than termination. Examination
of a pair of Massachusetts cases provides some examples of the types
of less harmful alternatives that minority shareholders may be able to
put forth.
In Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., the court addressed
a situation in which two of the three equal shareholders of a corpora-
tion that performed software consulting services terminated Leslie,
the third shareholder, due to complaints by employees about the way
that he treated them and complaints by customers about the quality of
his work.155 An additional reason for Leslie's termination was that he
billed significantly less than the other two shareholders in part be-
cause he performed most of the administrative functions for the busi-
ness. 156 The court held that there were less harmful alternatives to
termination, including: restructuring Leslie's duties so that he was "in-
sulated from direct contact with ... employees;" encouraging and as-
sisting him in "becoming more extensively involved in [billable]
projects;" directing him to "take courses to upgrade his skills;" and
implementing "creative compensation techniques.' 1 57
In Keating v. Keating, the court addressed a situation involving a
dispute between a brother and sister regarding who was to lead a fam-
ily business.' 58 The father, who was the majority shareholder, chose
the sister and terminated the employment of the brother, Paul Keat-
ing, Jr.' 59 The court held that while the father's choice of the sister
may have been a legitimate business decision, there were less harmful
155. No. 010268BLS; 2002 WL 532605, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002).
156. Id. at *2.
157. Id. at *8.
158. No. 00-749, 2003 WL 23213143, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2003).
159. Id. at *24-25, *49.
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alternatives to terminating Paul Jr. 160 For instance, Paul Jr. could
have been assigned different duties and placed in a different position
on the organizational chart and could have been assigned to a differ-
ent location in the central office or in another location. 161
Despite both the Leslie and Keating courts' conclusions that that
the majority should have made accommodations to enable the minor-
ity shareholder to remain employed, neither court ordered that the
shareholder's employment be reinstated. Both courts acknowledged
that the relationships were too damaged for the parties to ever be able
to work together again.162 However, the courts did not order the
same remedy. Both Leslie and Paul Jr. had requested that the major-
ity shareholders be ordered to purchase their shares. The Leslie court
refused to order this remedy and instead awarded Leslie six months'
severance pay and additional damages in the amount of bonuses,
which were actually disguised dividends that the two other sharehold-
ers had received. 163 The court further ordered that any future pay-
ments made to the majority shareholders that were classified as salary
but were actually disguised dividends should be paid in the same
amount and at the same time to Leslie. 164 Lastly, the court ordered
that Leslie should be reinstated as a full voting member of the board
of directors so that he would be aware of the operations of the corpo-
ration and would be able to participate in management. 165 In con-
trast, the Keating court granted Paul Jr.'s request for a court ordered
buyout of his shares.' 66
Thus, although the Leslie court determined that the relationship be-
tween Leslie and the other two shareholders was too broken for Leslie
to remain an employee of the corporation, it ordered a remedy that
required ongoing interaction between Leslie and the other sharehold-
ers. The Keating court, on the other hand, by ordering a buyout of
Paul Jr.'s shares, provided for a complete break between Paul Jr. and
the other shareholders. The Keating court's order of a buyout is the
more logical and constructive remedy and has become the remedy
most favored by courts.
160. See id. at *50.
161. Id.
162. Leslie, 2002 WL 532605, at *9; Keating, 2003 WL 23213143, at *18.
163. Leslie, 2002 WL 532605, at *8-9.
164. Id. at *9.
165. Id.
166. Keating, 2003 WL 23213143, at *50.
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V. REMEDIES IN OPPRESSION THROUGH TERMINATION
OF EMPLOYMENT CASES
Prior to the 1970s, the only remedy oppression statutes provided
was dissolution. Courts traditionally described dissolution as a drastic
remedy and were, therefore, hesitant to grant requests by minority
shareholders for dissolution.167 The view that dissolution is drastic
arose out of concern that it would result in the death of the business
with the accordant loss of jobs and tax revenue. 168
In the 1970s, state legislatures began amending their corporation
acts to provide courts with the authority to order alternate remedies
to dissolution upon a finding of minority shareholder oppression.
Most states, whether through statutes or common law, now permit
courts to order a full "range of equitable remedies." 169 Examples of
alternate remedies include: "removal from office of any director or
officer," the "appointment of an individual as a director or officer,"
the "appointment of a custodian to manage ... the corporation," an
order to pay dividends, "damages to [the] aggrieved party," and the
"purchase by the corporation or one or more other shareholders" of
the minority shareholder's shares. 170 The authorization of remedies
that are less drastic then dissolution caused courts to relax the require-
ments for a finding of oppression and has encouraged the acceptance
by courts of the reasonable expectations approach.
1 71
The most common remedy now is the court ordered buy-out of the
minority shareholder's shares by either the majority shareholders or
the corporation. 172 This remedy is consistent with the understanding
that employment by the corporation is the vehicle through which the
shareholder receives the return on his or her investment. 173 The buy-
out remedy also solves the lack of exit problem by providing a forced
market for the minority shareholder's shares. Additionally, unlike
remedies such as the remedy ordered by the Leslie Court that require
ongoing interaction between the battling shareholders, it provides a
means for the parties who, certainly by the time that they ended up in
litigation, cannot continue to work together to separate. However, in
order to properly compensate the minority shareholder for the loss of
167. See Murdock, supra note 63, at 440-41.
168. Id.
169. John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppres-
sion in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 679 (2007).
170. See, e.g., Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12.56(b)
(West 2014).
171. See Murdock, supra note 63, at 464.
172. Id. at 470.
173. Moll, Investment Model, supra note 65, at 566-67.
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his or her investment, the valuation method must be fair. 74 Disputes
over the proper method of valuing the business are often a central
part of shareholder oppression litigation. Moreover, although not
considered by many courts, in order to fully compensate a terminated
shareholder-employee for both the loss of his or her investment as
well as the loss of wages through employment, courts may also award
back pay and severance as compensatory damages. 175
VI. CONCLUSION
Termination of a minority shareholder's employment is a common
and effective freeze out technique. This is because, for most share-
holders of closely held corporations, providing self-employment is
their primary purpose in participating in the formation of or joining
the corporation. Over the past forty years, an extensive body of law
has developed to protect minority shareholders who are victims of
freeze outs; however, courts struggle to define what type of conduct
on the part of majority shareholders constitutes oppression. In recent
years, the principle that conduct is oppressive when it violates the rea-
sonable expectations that the shareholder had when he or she partici-
pated in the formation of or joined the corporation has gained
increasing acceptance and is now the accepted rule in a majority of
states. However, courts still face the task of articulating what expecta-
tions are reasonable.
A review of decisions involving shareholder oppression and breach
of fiduciary duty claims arising out of termination of employment
reveals that there is no uniform consensus as to when a shareholder's
expectation of continued employment will be deemed reasonable.
However, certain common threads have emerged.
Where employment is intertwined with the shareholder's invest-
ment in the corporation, the shareholder will have an easier time es-
tablishing that his or her expectation of continued employment is
reasonable. Shareholders who participated in the founding of the cor-
poration will have an easier time establishing the reasonableness of
their expectation of continued employment than non-founder share-
holders, such as shareholders who received their shares through gift or
inheritance or shareholders who were permitted to purchase shares of
an existing corporation as part of an employment compensation
package.
174. Murdock, supra note 63, at 470-71.
175. See, e.g., Cooke v. Fresh Exp. Foods Corp., 7 P.3d 717, 725 (Or. 2000).
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Shareholders who sign employment agreements providing that their
employment may be terminated without cause must overcome the dif-
ficult hurdle of negating the argument that any expectation of contin-
ued employment was unreasonable in light of their assent to a
termination without cause provision. Shareholders who sign share-
holder or buy-sell agreements providing for the repurchase of their
shares upon involuntary termination will often also face the challenge
of overcoming the argument that their consent to such a provision was
an acknowledgment that they could be involuntarily terminated for
any reason that negates the reasonableness of any expectation of con-
tinued employment. However, extrapolating that a shareholder
waived any expectation of continued employment from a repurchase
upon involuntary termination provision in a buy-sell agreement is
problematic as buy-sell agreements are generally not intended to me-
morialize the parties' understandings concerning employment.
Some courts hold that a shareholder's personal guaranty of corpo-
rate debt is a significant factor in evaluating the reasonableness of a
shareholder's expectation of continued employment as shareholders
who agree to be personally liable for corporate debt likely expect to
remain managerial employees so that they can ensure that the debt
has repaid. Given the prevalence of personal guarantees, it is surpris-
ing that this factor has not received more attention by courts.
Where shareholders have committed misconduct or performed their
employment duties incompetently, they will have a difficult time es-
tablishing that any expectation of continued employment is
reasonable.
While, under a pure reasonable expectations approach, courts do
not consider the legitimacy of the majority shareholder's purpose for
termination, some courts that apply the reasonable expectations ap-
proach will attempt to balance the minority shareholder's expecta-
tions with the majority's interest in running the business efficiently. In
those courts, once the majority is able to establish a legitimate busi-
ness purpose, the minority shareholder is afforded an opportunity to
establish that that purpose could have been achieved through means
less harmful to the minority shareholder than termination. In evaluat-
ing the legitimacy of the majority's purpose, courts will attempt to dis-
tinguish between pretextual reasons for termination and legitimate
business concerns.
There are very few reported cases in which courts have discussed
what types of less harmful alternatives majority shareholders are re-
quired to employ. The few decisions that have addressed this issue
suggest that majority shareholders may be required to provide the mi-
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nority shareholder with accommodations such as different jiob duties
or to allow them to work at different locations.
Once shareholders establish that termination of their employment
is a violation of their reasonable expectations and, therefore, oppres-
sive, courts now have a range of equitable remedies from which to
choose. The most common remedy is the court ordered buyout of the
minority shareholder's shares by the majority shareholders or the cor-
poration. This remedy is the most logical alternative as it is consistent
with the understanding that employment by the corporation is the ve-
hicle through which the shareholder received a return on his or her
investment, solves the lack of exit problem by providing a market for
the minority shareholder's shares, and provides for a complete separa-
tion of parties who can no longer cooperate and should not continue
to own a business together.
